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Abstract 
 
Changes in the labor share of national income affect inequality (Piketty 2014). This paper 
aims at investigating the relationship between the labor share and technical progress, based 
on provincial data of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 1978 to 2012. Our main 
empirical results show that technical progress in the PRC had been mostly capital biased, 
contributing to the fast rises in income inequality in the PRC. However, the employment 
proportion of state-owned enterprises seems to have played a role in offsetting this negative 
effect, helping contain inequality. In recent years, both effects have become more significant 
and larger in absolute terms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At the aggregate level, national income equals the sum of compensations to labor and 
capital. Thus, inequality of per capita income as measured by the Gini coefficient  
can be expressed as a weighted sum of concentration indexes of labor and capital 
inputs where the weights are simply the labor share and capital share. For given 
concentrations of wage and capital, national inequality becomes a function of labor or 
capital share. Because labor is generally more evenly distributed than capital, a rise or 
fall in the labor share implies a fall or rise of income inequality. 
Recently, a growing literature points to the stylized fact of declining labor share 
globally. For example, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) found that among the 
59 countries with at least 15 years of data between 1975 and 2012, 42 exhibited 
downward trends in the labor share. Also, labor share in Germany and France had 
been falling almost continuously since the early 1980s after rising sharply in the wake 
of the two oil price shocks in the 1970s (Blanchard 1997; Bentilola and Saint-Paul 
1998; Rowthorn 1999; Caballero and Hammour 1997). A similar trend has also  
been observed in developing countries since the early 1990s. As mentioned earlier,  
the declining labor share means worsening income distribution (Piketty 2014). To 
understand this declining trend, it is crucial to identify and analyze the determinants of 
the labor share. 
One of the most important determinants of factor share is technical progress. Unless 
technical change is neutral, it will cause variations in the labor or capital share. For 
example, capital-biased technical progress will induce more capital investment, 
replacing labor by capital and causing declines in the labor share (see Acemoglu 2002, 
2003; Caselli 2007). The contrary holds when labor-biased technology change prevails. 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between technical progress and labor share 
in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Although previous papers have studied this 
relationship using global data and data from developed economies, it remains 
worthwhile exploring this relationship for the PRC. On the one hand, the PRC is the 
largest developing economy; thus, changes in the PRC’s labor share will have a 
significant impact on global labor share or global inequality. According to the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, the labor share had been decreasing during 1978–2012, 
especially after the 1990s when it declined from 61% in 1990 to around 46% in 2007 
(Bai and Qian 2010). Such dramatic declines must have contributed to fast rises in the 
PRC’s income inequality (Wan 2007, 2008). On the other hand, the PRC’s labor market 
is far from complete. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) still shoulder the responsibility of 
maintaining social stability, partly by providing employment. Even today, the market 
share of the PRC’s SOEs is still significant. Thus, although technical progress is 
expected to be biased toward capital in the PRC, its effect on the labor share may be 
offset by the presence of SOEs. 
Based on the PRC’s provincial data over the period from 1978 to 2012, this paper first 
explores the nature and measures the extent of technical progress using the supply-
side normalized Constant Elasticity of Substitution production function system of Klump 
et al. (2007). We then estimate the impacts of factor-biased technical progress on the 
labor share, paying special attention to the role of SOEs. It is found that technical 
progress in the PRC had been mostly capital-biased, contributing to the fast rises in 
income inequality in the PRC. However, the presence of SOEs seems to have played a 
role in offsetting this negative distributive effect, helping contain inequality. In recent 
years, both effects became more significant and larger in absolute terms. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents literature review. In 
section 3, an indicator of capital-biased technical progress is proposed, which is built 
on the supply-side normalized CES production function system. In section 4, we 
discuss data and empirical method. Section 5 provides estimation results. Finally, 
section 6 concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The determinants of labor share have been explored extensively. They include 
economic growth (Raffalovich et al. 1992), structural transformation (Serres 2001; 
Morel 2005), and globalization (Diwan 2000, 2001; Jaumotte and Tytell 2007; 
Decreuse and Maarek 2015). The effects of economic growth and structural 
transformation on labor share are widely accepted. Regarding globalization, Harrison 
(2002), using country-level data from 1960 to 1997, finds that it actually reduces labor 
share. He argues that the bargaining power of capital became stronger than that of 
labor in the globalizing era, resulting in declines of the labor share. 
Institutional forces matter too as factor shares of income are partly determined by 
changes in the relative position of capital and labor. For example, Bentolina and  
Saint-Paul (2003) show that labor unions affect labor’s bargaining power. As another 
example, Bai and Qian (2010) attribute changes in factor share of income in the PRC 
to changes in the labor market, which had experienced increasing monopoly power and 
various reforms in the state-owned sectors. 
Regarding the relationship between capital-biased technical progress and labor share, 
Acemoglu (2003) takes technology progress as an endogenous variable and points  
out that capital-biased technical progress affects labor share of income. Young (2004) 
develops a Real Business Cycle model incorporating capital-biased technical progress. 
His dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model explains seasonal changes in labor 
share of income in the United States. However, the relationship between capital-biased 
technical progress and labor share in the PRC is not yet examined in the literature, and 
this paper aims at filling this gap. 
3. MEASURE OF CAPITAL-BIASED  
TECHNICAL PROGRESS 
3.1 Indicators of Capital-Biased Technical Progress 
According to Acemoglu (2002, 2003, and 2007), capital-biased technical progress  
can be defined as follows. Using Y to denote output, a production function with  
factor-augmented technologies can be written as follows:  𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐴𝑡,𝑁𝑡 ,𝐵𝑡 ,𝐾𝑡)  (3.1) 
where  𝐴𝑡  and  𝐵𝑡  denote labor-augmented and capital-augmented technologies, 
respectively.  𝐾𝑡  represents capital and  𝑁𝑡  represents labor. Based on (3.1), capital-
biased technical progress can be expressed as 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ = 𝜕 �𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑁�
𝜕 �
𝐵
𝐴�
 (3.2) 
2 
 
ADBI Working Paper 672 Zhang, Wang, Wan, and Luo 
 
Intuitively,  𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ  measures to what extent technical progress affects the ratio of 
marginal returns to capital over marginal productivity to labor. When 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ is positive, 
technical progress is capital-biased; otherwise, it is labor-biased. 
Following the conventional wisdom, we apply the CES production function to model 
technical progress: 
𝑌 = �(1− 𝛼)(𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡)𝜎−1𝜎 + 𝛼(𝐵𝑡𝐾𝑡)𝜎−1𝜎 � 𝜎𝜎−1 (3.3) 
where  𝛼  denotes the extent of capital intensity, and  𝜎  represents the substitution 
elasticity of capital to labor. Thus, capital-biased technical progress can be  
expressed as 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ = 𝛼1− 𝛼�𝐾𝑡𝑁𝑡�−1𝜎 𝜎 − 1𝜎 �𝐵𝑡𝐴𝑡�−1𝜎 (3.4) 
In this case, for given capital and labor, when 𝜎 is larger than 1, a positive value of 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ implies capital-biased technology change, and vice versa. When 𝜎 is equal to 1, 
technical progress is neutral. 
Next, we apply the normalized supply-side system approach proposed by Klump et al. 
(2007) to estimate the substitution elasticity 𝜎. This approach has proven to be quite 
robust by Leon-Ledesma et al. (2010). Specifically, the normalized supply-side system 
can be described as follows: 
𝑙𝑛 �
𝑌𝑡
𝑌�
� = 𝑙𝑛(𝜉) + 𝜎
𝜎 − 1 𝑙𝑛
⎩
⎨
⎧(1− 𝛼) �𝑁𝑡
𝑁�
𝑒𝑥𝑝 ��?̅?
𝛾𝑁
𝜆𝑁
��
𝑡
?̅?
�
𝜆𝑁
− 1��𝜎−1𝜎   
 +𝛼 �𝐾𝑡
𝐾�
𝑒𝑥𝑝 ��?̅?
𝛾𝑁
𝜆𝑁
� �
𝑡
?̅?
�
𝜆𝑁
− 1��𝜎−1𝜎
⎭
⎬
⎫
 
(3.5) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛(1− 𝛼) + 𝑙𝑛 �𝑌�𝑁��+ 𝜎 − 1𝜎 𝑙𝑛(𝜉)− 𝜎 − 1𝜎 𝑙𝑛 �𝑌𝑡 𝑌�⁄𝑁𝑡 𝑁�⁄ � 
+𝜎 − 1
𝜎
��?̅?
𝛾𝑁
𝜆𝑁
��
𝑡
?̅?
�
𝜆𝑁
− 1� (3.6) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑟𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛𝛼 + 𝑙𝑛�𝑌�𝐾��+ 𝜎 − 1𝜎 𝑙𝑛(𝜉) −𝜎 − 1𝜎 𝑙𝑛�𝑌𝑡 𝑌�⁄𝐾𝑡 𝐾�⁄ � 
+𝜎 − 1
𝜎
��?̅?
𝛾𝐾
𝜆𝐾
� �
𝑡
?̅?
�
𝜆𝐾
− 1� (3.7) 
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Where t indexes time,  𝜉  denotes the adjustment coefficient so that  𝜉𝑌� = 𝑌0 ,   
𝑁� = 𝑁0 ,  𝐾� = 𝐾0 ,  ?̅? = 𝑡0 .  𝛾𝐾  and  𝛾𝑁  denote the growth rate of capital and labor 
productivity, and 𝜆𝐾 and 𝜆𝑁 represent the curvature of capital and labor productivity, 
respectively. In this system, the growth rate of factor productivity is set as the Box-Cox 
growth rate. Thus, (3.5)-(3.7) constitutes the complete normalized supply-side system, 
from which we can estimate 𝜎, 𝛾, 𝜆, and 𝛼. 
With the estimated 𝛼 and 𝜎, the index of capital-biased technology 𝐷𝑡 can be estimated 
as follows: 
𝐷𝑡 ≡
1
𝜀𝑡
𝜕𝜀𝑡
𝜕(𝐵𝑡 𝐴𝑡⁄ )𝑑(𝐵𝑡 𝐴𝑡⁄ )𝑑𝑡 = 𝜎 − 1𝜎 𝐴𝑡𝐵𝑡 𝑑(𝐵𝑡 𝐴𝑡⁄ )𝑑𝑡  (3.8) 
where 
𝜀𝑡 = 𝜕𝑌 𝜕𝐾⁄𝜕𝑌 𝜕𝑁⁄ = 𝛼1 −𝛼�𝐵𝑡𝐴𝑡�𝜎−1𝜎 �𝑁𝑡𝐾𝑡�1𝜎 (3.9) 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡𝑁𝑡 � 𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑡(1− 𝛼)(𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡𝐾𝑡)� 𝜎𝜎−1 (3.10) 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡𝐾𝑡 � 𝑟𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼(𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡𝐾𝑡)� 𝜎𝜎−1 (3.11) 
where 𝜀𝑡  represents the ratio of marginal labor to capital productivity. Thus, 
𝜕𝜀𝑡
𝜕(𝐵𝑡 𝐴𝑡⁄ ) 
measures to what extent 𝐵𝑡 𝐴𝑡⁄  affects 𝜀𝑡 . Consequently, the index of capital-biased 
technology  𝐷𝑡  captures the impact of technical progress �𝑑(𝐵𝑡 𝐴𝑡⁄ )𝑑𝑡 �  on the relative 
marginal productivity (𝜀𝑡). Finally, the inverse of 𝜀𝑡 can be used to normalize the impact 
for comparison between regions. In short, when 𝐷𝑡 is positive, implying that technical 
progress results in the increase of relative marginal productivity, the technology 
progress is capital-biased; otherwise, it is labor-biased. 
3.2 Data 
To obtain the index of capital-biased technology of (3.8), the parameter of capital 
intensity 𝛼 and the substitution elasticity of capital to labor 𝜎 must be estimated, using 
the supply-side normalized CES production function system (3.5)–(3.7). These require 
data on output, capital stock, labor input, labor income, and capital income, which  
are all available from the National Bureau of Statistics. Our data cover the period 
1978–2012 for 28 provinces in the PRC, excluding Tibet, Hainan, and Chongqing 
(included in Sichuan province). 
Capital Stock 
Capital stock is estimated using the perpetual inventory method. First, we estimate the 
initial real capital stock using the following equation: 
𝐾0 = 𝐼1 (𝑔 + 𝛿)⁄   (3.12) 
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where  𝐾0  is the initial capital stock,  𝐼1  is the capital investment in the first period 
deflated by the price index of fixed asset investment, 𝑔 is the growth rate of capital 
investment, and 𝛿 denotes the rate of capital depreciation. 
We use provincial fixed capital formation to measure capital investment, which is 
available from 1952 onward. Following Hall and Jones (1999), we average the growth 
rate of real fixed capital formation in the first 10 years (1953–1963) and use this 
average value as the growth rate of capital investment. The depreciation rate is  
set to be 5%. Note that our empirical modeling results are robust to different 
depreciation rates. 
Next, we iterate each year’s real capital stock using the following perpetual inventory 
method equation: 
𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑡+1 + (1 −𝛿)𝐾𝑡  (3.13) 
Thus, we obtain a complete data set of real provincial capital stock for 1952–2012. The 
nominal capital stock is obtained by multiplying the real capital stock by the price index 
of fixed asset investment. 
Labor Input 
We use the number of employees as the proxy of labor input, with data from China 
Statistical Yearbooks. 
Labor and Capital Income 
The National Bureau of Statistics (various years) provides annual data on the labor 
income (NI) and capital income (CI) for each province and each sector. We sum up 
provincial capital and labor income to obtain the provincial aggregate capital and  
labor income. 
There are two other components in provincial gross domestic product (GDP): net taxes 
on production (NT), or indirect tax, and depreciation (DE). The latter can be viewed  
as part of capital income. The indirect tax, following Lu et al. (2008), is proportionally 
shared between labor and capital. Thus, we have the following estimation of labor 
income and capital income: 
𝑤𝑁 = 𝑁𝐼 + 𝑁𝐼
𝑁𝐼 + 𝐶𝐼 +𝐷𝐸 𝑁𝑇 (3.14) 
𝑟𝐾 = 𝐷𝐸 + 𝐶𝐼 +𝐷𝐸
𝑁𝐼 + 𝐶𝐼 + 𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑇 (3.15) 
3.3 Estimation Results 
To estimate the system of (3.5)-(3.7) as seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), we 
employ the feasible generalized nonlinear least squares (FGNLS) method. As Klump  
et al. (2007) pointed out, the results are only sensitive to different starting values of 𝜎, 
since the system has a singularity at 𝜎 = 1.  
We used different starting values of 𝜎 for the nonlinear system estimation. It turns out 
that for various starting values of 𝜎 < 1, the estimation always converges to the same 
point for each province. However, for starting values that are greater than 1, the 
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estimation converges to a different point. However, the sums of squared residual are 
found to be always smaller in the earlier case.  
Table 1 presents the estimation results. It is clear that the elasticities of substitution  
in most provinces are smaller than 1. The provincial index of capital-biased technology 
progress are then computed and presented in Figure 1. It shows that the index is 
positive in most cases, confirming that the technical progress is mostly capital-biased. 
The same results are obtained when estimations are undertaken using data 
subsamples for 1978–1992 and 1993–2012, respectively. The first subsample starts 
with the year of reform initiation and opening up and ends with the year of Deng 
Xiaoping’s southern tour. The second sample mirrors the period with deepened reforms 
and fast economic growth. The estimation results for the two periods are quite similar, 
as shown in Figure 2. 
Table 1: Estimates of Substitution Elasticity 
Province ξ σ α Province ξ σ α 
Beijing 0.970*** 0.942*** 0.557*** Shandong 1.060*** 0.899*** 0.451*** 
(–0.016) (–0.009) (–0.004) (–0.015) (–0.025) (–0.007) 
Tianjin 0.911*** 0.659*** 0.518*** Henan 1.019*** 0.794*** 0.354*** 
(–0.015) (–0.015) (–0.008) (–0.021) (–0.014) (–0.006) 
Hebei 1.074*** 1.000*** 0.411*** Hubei 0.998*** 0.613*** 0.343*** 
(–0.021) (–0.001) (–0.006) (–0.021) (–0.011) (–0.012) 
Jiangxi 0.971*** 0.963*** 0.473*** Hunan 0.993*** 0.810*** 0.297*** 
(–0.014) (–0.011) (–0.007) (–0.018) (–0.018) (–0.007) 
Inner 
Mongolia 
0.958*** 0.632*** 0.373*** Shandong 1.152*** 0.964*** 0.394*** 
(–0.015) (–0.014) (–0.007) (–0.020) (–0.007) (–0.004) 
Liaoning 0.993*** 0.809*** 0.493*** Guangxi 1.080*** 0.973*** 0.325*** 
(–0.009) (–0.014) (–0.005) (–0.027) (–0.012) (–0.007) 
Jilin 0.978*** 0.667*** 0.336*** Guizhou 0.955*** 0.896*** 0.327*** 
(–0.019) (–0.024) (–0.012) (–0.023) (–0.016) (–0.010) 
Heilongjiang 1.015*** 0.911*** 0.450*** Yunnan 1.101*** 0.985*** 0.382*** 
(–0.018) (–0.019) (–0.008) (–0.023) (–0.004) (–0.006) 
Shanghai 0.921*** 0.782*** 0.593*** Shanxi 0.950*** 0.722*** 0.350*** 
(–0.022) (–0.008) (–0.006) (–0.019) (–0.048) (–0.008) 
Jiangsu 0.964*** 0.974*** 0.439*** Gansu 0.968*** 0.971*** 0.391*** 
(–0.018) (–0.005) (–0.004) (–0.013) (–0.006) (–0.004) 
Zhejiang 1.065*** 0.958*** 0.462*** Qinghai 0.961*** 0.852*** 0.342*** 
(–0.018) (–0.011) (–0.006) (–0.02) (–0.010) (–0.006) 
Anhui 1.015*** 0.853*** 0.349*** Ningxia 0.997*** 0.992*** 0.408*** 
(–0.017) (–0.020) (–0.007) (–0.015) (–0.006) (–0.004) 
Fujian 1.157*** 0.968*** 0.365*** Xinjiang 1.088*** 0.956*** 0.352*** 
(–0.023) (–0.007) (–0.005) (–0.015) (–0.021) (–0.006) 
Jiangxi 1.011*** 0.769*** 0.321*** Sichuan 0.900*** 0.735*** 0.333*** 
(–0.017) (–0.020) (–0.008) (–0.016) (–0.009) (–0.008) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors. 
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Figure 1: Index of Capital-Biased Technology (Whole Sample) 
 
Source: Authors. 
Figure 2: Index of Capital-Biased Technology (Split Sample) 
 
Source: Authors. 
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4. THE TECHNICAL PROGRESS – LABOR  
SHARE RELATIONSHIP 
In this section, we estimate the impact of biased technical progress on the labor share. 
We follow the modeling strategy of Decreuse and Maarek (2015), which focuses on the 
effect of globalization on the labor share. We simply extend their model by adding the 
index of biased technical progress as the key variable: 
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4.1) 
where i indexes province and t indexes year.  𝑆𝑖𝑡  denotes the labor share, 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ 
represents capital-biased technical progress, 𝑋  contains control variables.  𝜂  and  𝜇 
represent year and provincial fixed effects, respectively.  𝑢 is the usual white noise  
term. In (4.1), all independent variables are lagged to alleviate possible endogeneity.  
𝛽 measures the effect of capital-biased technical progress on the labor share, and we 
expect 𝛽 to be negative. 
The following control variables are considered. First, cross-sectional variations in the 
labor share are related to distortions in the factor markets. Bai and Qian (2010) argue 
that the main causes of factor market distortion in the PRC are government behavior 
(as measured by government expenditure over GDP) and the presence of SOE in 
terms of their proportion in total employment, both of which are included in (4.1). 
Second, globalization indicators of trade (% of GDP) and foreign direct investment or 
FDI (% of GDP) are controlled in (4.1). FDI may induce higher labor share via 
increased competition. It may also help lower the labor share due to labor productivity 
improvement induced by FDI-related technology changes (Decreuse and Maarek 
2015). Intuitively, importing labor-intensive goods erodes the labor share while 
exporting labor-intensive goods can increase the labor share (Jaumotte and Tytell 
2007). However, as pointed out by Melitz (2003), exports in general may help improve 
aggregate productivity by increasing the market share of more productive firms, 
resulting in lower labor share. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labor Share 980 0.583 0.107 0.272 0.928 
Index of Biased Technology 1 952 0.024 0.107 –0.434 0.474 
Index of Biased Technology 2 952 0.017 0.106 –0.503 0.351 
SOE Employment Proportion 946 0.704 0.136 0.207 0.917 
Secondary GDP Proportion 980 0.454 0.087 0.190 0.812 
Government Expenditure/GDP 980 0.154 0.073 0.049 0.612 
Trade/GDP 974 0.245 0.459 0.000 3.824 
FDI/GDP 822 0.028 0.039 0.000 0.322 
Education 979 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.035 
GDP per capita 980 7.352 1.076 5.156 10.296 
Capital-Output Ratio 980 1.132 0.660 0.474 5.128 
FDI = foreign direct investment, GDP = gross domestic product, SOE = state-owned enterprise. 
Source: CNBS’ Annual Industrial Survey. 
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Other control variables include human capital (measured by number of university 
students over population), which directly affects labor income and, thus, labor share 
and economic growth, which raises demand for labor but also increases labor cost and 
profits (Raffalovich et al. 1992). To capture the effect of structural transformation on the 
labor share, the manufacturing share in GDP is included. Since capital intensity 
captures the extent of factor endowment, defined as capital-output ratio, it is also 
controlled in our model. All nominal variables are appropriately deflated. Table 2 
presents the summary statistics. 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Baseline Results 
Table 3 presents estimation results for the baseline model (4.1). All regressions include 
year and province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level to 
alleviate possible serial correlation. 
Table 3: Baseline Results 
Labor Sharei,t (1) Labor Sharei,t (2) 
Index of Biased Technology 1i,t-1 –0.148*** Index of Biased Technology 2i,t-1 –0.159*** 
(–0.021) (–0.021) 
SOE Employment Proportioni,t-1 0.028 SOE Employment Proportioni,t-1 0.026 
(–0.113) (–0.114) 
Secondary GDP Proportioni,t-1 –0.676*** Secondary GDP Proportioni,t-1 –0.678*** 
(–0.201) (–0.200) 
Government Expenditure/ 
GDPi,t-1 
–0.284** Government Expenditure/ 
GDPi,t-1 
–0.252* 
(–0.137) (–0.136) 
Trade/GDPi,t-1 –0.012 Trade/GDPi,t-1 –0.010 
(–0.012) (–0.013) 
FDI/GDPi,t-1 0.173 FDI/GDPi,t-1 0.147 
(–0.204) (–0.206) 
Educationi,t-1 –1.309 Educationi,t-1 –0.951 
(–2.295 ) (–2.201) 
GDP per capitai,t-1 –0.001 GDP per capitai,t-1 –0.004 
(–0.101) (–0.100) 
Capital-output Ratioi,t-1 0.000 Capital-output Ratioi,t-1 0.000 
(–0.035) (–0.034) 
Provincial Fixed Effect YES Provincial Fixed Effect YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES Year Fixed Effect YES 
N 766 N 766 
R2 0.748 R2 0.751 
FDI = foreign direct investment, GDP = gross domestic product. 
Notes:  
1) Index of Biased Technology 1 is estimated using the whole sample; Index of Biased Technology 2 is estimated using 
the split sample. 
2) Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors. 
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In column (1) of Table 3, we use the index of capital-biased technology estimated using 
the whole data sample of 1978–2012. The result shows that in general, capital-biased 
technical progress reduces the labor share. A 1-percentage-point increase in the  
index of capital-biased technology leads to approximately 0.15 percentage point 
decrease in the labor share. This impact confirms our prior expectation that  
capital-biased technology will increase the marginal output of and return to capital 
relative to labor, which reduces the labor income share. This negative relationship  
is a robust-to-different measure of biased technology. Using the index estimated  
using the split samples of 1978–1992 and 1993–2012, similar results are found, as 
column (2) demonstrates. 
Turning to control variables, government expenditure is found to reduce labor share. A 
possible explanation lies in the capital-biased government expenditure on infrastructure 
investment and industrial support. The manufacturing share in GDP also depresses the 
labor share. This is reasonable as the manufacturing sector is more capital intensive 
than the agriculture and service sectors. With the development of the manufacturing 
sector, the share of the agriculture sector declines, so does the labor income share. 
The impacts of other control variables are insignificant, including globalization 
indicators, GDP per capita, human capital, and capital intensity. The insignificance of 
the coefficient of SOE employment proportion will be further explored below.  
5.2 The Effects of State-Owned Enterprises 
In Table 3, we do not find a significant impact of SOE employment proportion on the 
labor share. This is not consistent with the finding of Bai and Qian (2010), who show a 
significant and positive relationship, without controlling biased technical progress. 
Therefore, the reason for the insignificance may lie in the inclusion of the biased 
technology index. It is possible that the effect of SOE on the labor share has been 
absorbed by biased technical progress.  
It is well recognized that the operating efficiency of the PRC’s SOEs is lower than  
non-SOEs, while non-SOEs are faced with credit constraint. Song et al. (2011) argue 
that non-SOEs can undo credit constraint through internal saving and capital 
accumulation, leading to the downsizing of SOEs. As a consequence, the capital 
income share will increase as non-SOEs adopt relatively more capital-biased 
technologies. In this case, the correlation between the SOE variable and the index of 
capital-biased technology is negative, and thus it became positively correlated with  
the labor share. 
More importantly, SOEs have soft budget constraints and also share the social 
responsibility to provide jobs to maintain social stability (Lin and Tan 1999; Kornai et al. 
2003). On the other hand, compared with non-SOEs, the trade union of SOEs is larger 
and better organized, which helps protect labor income. Therefore, it is expected that in 
those regions where SOE proportions are higher, the effect of capital-biased technical 
progress on job replacement, and thus on the labor share, might be weakened. 
To explore the role of the SOE variable in the relationship between capital-biased 
technical progress and labor income share, we extend model (4.1) by adding the 
interaction between SOE and Tech: 
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (5.1) 
We expect the coefficient of the interaction (𝛽2) to be positive. 
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Table 4 presents the estimation results of model (5.1). Column (1) uses the index 
estimated with the whole sample, and column (2) uses the estimates based on the split 
samples. Consistent with prior expectation, the coefficient of the interactive term is 
positive and significant. The results are robust-to-different measures of capital-biased 
technical progress. Once the interaction is controlled, the absolute value of the 
coefficient of capital-biased technical progress becomes much larger. This suggests 
that, if there are no SOEs in the economy, a 1% point increase in the index of  
capital-biased technology will lead to approximately 0.52 percentage point decrease in 
the labor share. Evaluated at the sample mean of SOE, the SOEs offset the negative 
effect of capital-biased technical progress on the labor share by roughly 0.352%, which 
is quite significant. 
Table 4: The Effects of State-Owned Enterprises 
Labor Sharei,t (1) Labor Sharei,t (2) 
Index of Biased Technology 1i,t-1 –0.553*** Index of Biased Technology 2i,t-1 –0.520*** 
(–0.160) (–0.173) 
Index of Biased Technology 1i,t-1* 
SOE Employment Proportioni,t-1 
0.569*** Index of Biased Technology 2i,t-1* 
SOE Employment Proportioni,t-1 
0.489** 
(–0.215) (–0.217) 
SOE Employment Proportioni,t-1 0.032 SOE Employment Proportioni,t-1 0.032 
(–0.110) (–0.114) 
Secondary GDP Proportioni,t-1 –0.660*** Secondary GDP Proportioni,t-1 –0.669*** 
(–0.194) (–0.196) 
Government Expenditure/GDPi,t-1 –0.285** Government Expenditure/GDPi,t-1 –0.259* 
(–0.140) (–0.141) 
Trade/GDPi,t-1 –0.013 Trade/GDPi,t-1 –0.011 
(–0.012) (–0.013) 
FDI/GDPi,t-1 0.193 FDI/GDPi,t-1 0.157 
(–0.210) (–0.211) 
Educationi,t-1 –0.837 Educationi,t-1 –0.836 
(–2.260) (–2.199) 
GDP per capitai,t-1 –0.004 GDP per capitai,t-1 –0.008 
(–0.099) (–0.098) 
Capital-output Ratioi,t-1 0.000 Capital-output Ratioi,t-1 0.000 
(–0.034) (–0.034) 
Provincial Fixed Effect Y Provincial Fixed Effect Y 
Year Fixed Effect Y Year Fixed Effect Y 
N 766 N 766 
R2 0.748 R2 0.751 
FDI = foreign direct investment, GDP = gross domestic product. 
Notes:  
1) Index of Biased Technology 1 is estimated using the whole sample; Index of Biased Technology 2 is estimated using 
the split sample. 
2) Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors. 
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5.3 Further Robustness Check 
So far, we have presented empirical results that support a priori expectation on the 
relationship between technical progress and the labor share, as well as the role that the 
PRC’s SOEs play in this relationship. Our results are robust-to-different estimates of 
capital-biased technology. In what follows, we further explore the robustness of the 
results in two other directions. First, we consider potential measurement errors. 
Second, we investigate the relationship for different time intervals. 
5.3.1 Measurement Errors 
We mainly consider possible measurement errors of the SOE variable. In sections 5.1 
and 5.2, we used employment proportion as a proxy of SOE presence. In Table 5,  
we redo Tables 3 and 4 using its fixed asset proportion to represent the presence of 
SOE. The results remain robust to different measures of capital-biased technology: 
capital-biased technical progress depresses labor income share, and SOEs help offset 
such effects and contribute to equity. 
Table 5: Robustness Check for Measurement Error 
Labor Sharei,t 
Index of Biased Technology 1 Index of Biased Technology 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Index of Biased Technologyi,t-1 –0.148*** –0.336*** –0.158*** –0.327*** 
(–0.021) (–0.080) (–0.021) (–0.090) 
Index of Biased Technologyi,t-1* 
SOE Fixed Asset Proportioni,t-1 
 0.327***  0.296** 
 (–0.117)  (–0.130) 
SOE Fixed Asset Proportioni,t-1 –0.031 –0.040 –0.027 –0.032 
(–0.054) (–0.052) (–0.054) (–0.052) 
Secondary GDP Proportioni,t-1 –0.623*** –0.606*** –0.628*** –0.615*** 
(–0.170 ) (–0.163) (–0.168) (–0.164) 
Government Expenditure/GDPi,t-1 –0.276** –0.281** –0.241** –0.245** 
(–0.108) (–0.112) (–0.106) (–0.110) 
Trade/GDPi,t-1 –0.009 –0.010 –0.007 –0.007 
(–0.011) (–0.011) (–0.012) (–0.012) 
FDI/GDPi,t-1 0.160 0.167 0.138 0.143 
(–0.176) (–0.177) (–0.176) (–0.174) 
Educationi,t-1 –2.235 –2.027 –1.839 –1.852 
(–2.446) (–2.369) (–2.354) (–2.328 ) 
GDP per capitai,t-1 –0.002 –0.006 –0.005 –0.009 
(–0.096) (–0.094) (–0.095) (–0.093) 
Capital-output Ratioi,t-1 –0.014 –0.011 –0.013 –0.013 
(–0.041) (–0.039) (–0.040) (–0.039) 
Provincial Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
N 781 781 781 781 
R2 0.737 0.741 0.740 0.742 
FDI = foreign direct investment, GDP = gross domestic product. 
Notes:  
1) Index of Biased Technology 1 is estimated using the whole sample; Index of Biased Technology 2 is estimated using 
the split sample. 
2) Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors. 
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5.3.2 Different Time Intervals 
Next, we estimate the regression models for different time periods: 1978–1992 and 
1993–2012. Table 6 presents the results with Tech estimated using the whole sample, 
while Table 7 reports results with Tech estimated using the split samples. Clearly, for 
most regressions, previous results are found to hold. 
A more interesting finding is that, the coefficients of Tech and its interaction with  
SOE are more significant and larger in absolute terms in the more recent period of 
1993–2012. This is rather intuitive, as the wage income before 1992 was mostly set by 
the government, rather than the firm’s profit maximization consideration, resulting in 
weak correlation between capital-biased technical progress and the labor income 
share. For the same reason, the PRC’s SOEs did not play an important role in reducing 
the negative effect of capital-biased technical progress on the labor share. The contrary 
occurred after Deng Xiaoping’s south tour in 1992. The tour drove the PRC’s rapid 
development of the manufacturing sector, with faster accumulation of capital along with 
enhanced capital-biased technical progress.  
Table 6: Subsample Robustness Check for Index of Biased Technology 1 
Labor Sharei,t 
1978–1992 1993–2012 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Index of Biased Technologyi,t-1 –0.133*** –0.114 –0.157*** –0.539*** 
(–0.017) (–0.250) (–0.026) (–0.128) 
Index of Biased Technologyi,t-1* 
SOE Fixed Asset Proportioni,t-1 
 –0.026  0.551*** 
 (–0.333)  (–0.173) 
SOE Fixed Asset Proportioni,t-1 –0.386 –0.386 –0.099 –0.100 
(–0.322) (–0.323) (–0.107) (–0.101) 
Secondary GDP Proportioni,t-1 –0.219* –0.218* –0.416** –0.407** 
(–0.130) (–0.130) (–0.178) (–0.171) 
Government Expenditure/GDPi,t-1 –0.078 –0.077 –0.216* –0.213* 
(–0.172) (–0.174) (–0.123) (–0.125) 
Trade/GDPi,t-1 –0.044** –0.044** 0.004 0.003 
(–0.020) (–0.020) (–0.014) (–0.013) 
FDI/GDPi,t-1 –0.032 –0.035 0.117 0.138 
(–0.394) (–0.380) (–0.164) (–0.164) 
Educationi,t-1 8.958 8.950 –4.037 –3.750 
(–7.078) (–7.133) (–2.508) (–2.449) 
GDP per capitai,t-1 –0.177*** –0.177*** –0.032 –0.024 
(–0.063) (–0.063) (–0.092) (–0.089) 
Capital-output Ratioi,t-1 0.052*** 0.052*** –0.041 –0.045 
(–0.016) (–0.016) (–0.066) (–0.066) 
Provincial Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
N 228 228 538 538 
R2 0.967 0.967 0.783 0.788 
FDI = foreign direct investment, GDP = gross domestic product. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors. 
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Table 7: Subsample Robustness Check for Index of Biased Technology 2 
Labor Sharei,t 
1978–1992 1993–2012 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Index of Biased Technologyi,t-1 –0.137*** –0.262*** –0.159*** –0.514*** 
(–0.015) (–0.094) (–0.023) (–0.150) 
Index of Biased Technologyi,t-1* 
SOE Fixed Asset Proportioni,t-1 
 0.161  0.493** 
 (–0.122)  (–0.193) 
SOE Fixed Asset Proportioni,t-1 –0.526 –0.530 –0.106 –0.099 
(–0.348) (–0.348) (–0.110) (–0.110) 
Secondary GDP Proportioni,t-1 –0.217* –0.217* –0.448** –0.442** 
(–0.130) (–0.130) (–0.177) (–0.173) 
Government Expenditure/GDPi,t-1 –0.036 –0.044 –0.174 –0.174 
(–0.152) (–0.151) (–0.121) (–0.124) 
Trade/GDPi,t-1 –0.037 –0.037 0.006 0.006 
(–0.023) (–0.023) (–0.015) (–0.015) 
FDI/GDPi,t-1 –0.230 –0.205 0.106 0.115 
(–0.452) (–0.444) (–0.166) (–0.166) 
Educationi,t-1 9.672 9.605 –3.869 –3.835 
(–7.907) (–7.885) (–2.450) (–2.442) 
GDP per capitai,t-1 –0.179** –0.182*** –0.025 –0.022 
(–0.070) (–0.070) (–0.090) (–0.088) 
Capital-output Ratioi,t-1 0.058*** 0.057*** –0.035 –0.039 
(–0.017) (–0.017) (–0.065) (–0.066) 
Provincial Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
N 228 228 538 538 
R2 0.967 0.967 0.783 0.787 
FDI = foreign direct investment, GDP = gross domestic product. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper aims at investigating the relationship between technical progress and labor 
share of income, based on the PRC’s provincial data over the period from 1978  
to 2012. Two measures of capital-biased technical progress were constructed using  
a supply-side normalized CES production function system, coupled with feasible 
generalized nonlinear least square (FGNLS) estimation. Estimation results show that 
technical progress in the PRC is mostly capital biased. And the capital-biased technical 
progress depressed the labor income share. Because the increase of the capital share 
leads to higher inequality (Piketty 2014), such capital-biased technical progress 
contributes to worsening income distribution and social instability. On the other hand, 
the PRC’s SOEs play a role in providing job security, stabilizing the level of labor 
income and, thus, reducing the equity-deteriorating effect of capital-biased technical 
progress. Both effects are more significant and larger in absolute value in the more 
recent period.  
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The capital-biased technical progress is perhaps inevitable, as most developing 
economies, including the PRC, rely on the import and imitation of technology from 
developed economies, which are relatively more capital intensive. Accordingly, three 
policy options can be proposed to alleviate the negative effect on the labor share. First, 
the government shall institute a well-functioning child care program and related 
benefits. They can help increase fertility and labor force participation in both the short 
and the long run (Del Boca 2002). Second, capital-saving (labor-biased) technical 
progress should be promoted, which can increase the demand for labor input. Finally, 
healthy development of SOEs can also play a role in reducing the inequality effect of 
capital-biased technical progress, but its operating efficiency must be improved. 
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